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Abstract 
Purpose: This article aims to explore the Nigerian government’s budgetary response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic as well as the economic and social implications of the pandemic 
response. 
Design/methodology/approach: Our analysis is based on a review of secondary evidence such 
as Nigerian Federal Government budget documents, policy documents, Central Bank of 
Nigeria circulars, news media articles, World Bank and International Monetary Fund reports, 
Reports from Big Four accounting firms and policy think-tanks. 
Findings: We highlight how increased borrowing to fund COVID-19 related economic and 
social interventions have significantly squeezed Nigeria’s fiscal space. We also highlight that 
while some interventions provide short term economic relief to the poor and small businesses, 
other interventions and gaps in the policy response have the potential for significant negative 
impact on businesses, households and unemployment. In addition, we highlight the potential 
for long-term benefits to the health sector and for private sector engagement in corporate 
responsibility and philanthropy. 
Originality/value: We present a comprehensive account of the Nigerian government’s 
budgetary response to the COVID 19 pandemic and the economic and social implications of 
this response. 
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Introduction 
The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has affected most, if not all, countries in the world 
albeit to varying degrees as some countries have been more successful than others in limiting 
the spread of the disease, and in preventing deaths. All around the world unprecedented 
measures are being taken to combat the spread of the disease, while at the same time seeking 
to contain its effect on the economy and labour markets.  
A country’s ability to effectively respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and its attendant effects 
depends on its fiscal space. Fiscal space is defined as the “capacity of government to provide 
additional budgetary resources for a desired purpose without any prejudice to the 
sustainability of its financial position” (Heller, 2006, p. 75).  A country with small fiscal space 
faces a significant threat to the stability of its economy or its ability to respond to unexpected 
economic shocks or recessions (Elmendorf and Sheiner, 2017).  
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Nigeria was already facing significant shrinkage of its fiscal 
space. Although Nigeria has a diversified economy, the government relies disproportionately 
on the oil sector for its revenue. Nigeria’s heavy reliance on oil has made it vulnerable to the 
vagaries of international oil prices. A fall in global oil prices and poor macroeconomic 
management led the country into a recession in 2016 from which it only started to recover in 
the second quarter of 2017. Even after the recession, economic growth has been slow with 
economic growth remaining at less than the population growth rate. The slump in oil prices 
from the first quarter of 2020 further weakened the Nigerian economy, shrinking even more its 
fiscal space and ability to manage in times of crisis. 
With the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Nigeria faces both an economic and a health 
crisis to which it has responded with a raft of policy interventions and it is important to 
understand the budgetary responses, their fiscal implications and implications on the country’s 
financial sustainability, social inequality and socio-political stability (Bergmann and Grossi, 
2014; Grossi and Cepiku, 2014). This paper seeks to analyze the Nigerian budgetary response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic and the short- and long-term implications of these responses 
drawing on secondary data such as Nigerian Federal Government budget documents, policy 
documents, Central Bank of Nigeria circulars, news media articles, World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund reports, Reports from Big Four accounting firms and policy think-
tanks etc. 
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The rest of the paper is split into three major sections. The first of these deals with the Nigerian 
government’s response to COVID-19, the second deals with the funding of the pandemic 
response and the third deals with the implications of these responses. We then make some 
concluding remarks. 
The Nigerian Context  
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous nation with an estimated population of 205 million people 
and GDP of ₦145.64 trillion ($448.12 billion) in 2019 (United Nations, 2019). It is also the 
largest oil producer in Africa holding 29% of Africa’s proven oil reserves and was the world's 
fourth-largest exporter of liquified natural gas in 2015 (Ejiogu et al., 2019). Oil and gas revenue 
represent about 10% of Nigeria’s GDP. However, it accounts for about 50% of government 
revenues and over 90% of export earnings (Budget Office of the Federation, 2020a). In spite 
of its oil wealth, in early 2018 Nigeria overtook India as the ‘poverty capital’ of the world 
accounting for 15% of the world’s poor with an estimated 102 million people in extreme 
poverty1. However, unlike India where poverty is in decline, extreme poverty is growing in 
Nigeria at an estimated 6 people every minute and Nigeria is projected to account for 30% of 
the world’s poor by 2030 without taking the impact of COVID-19 into account (Kharas et al., 
2018; Page, 2020).  
Prior to the pandemic, Nigeria’s 2020 budget projected for revenue of ₦8.42 trillion and 
expenditure of ₦10.6 trillion (of which ₦2.45trillion related to debt servicing). The deficit of 
₦2.18 trillion ($5.65 billion) was to be financed by additional borrowing. Projections for the 
debt service to revenue ratio and the deficit to revenue ratio were 29% and 26% respectively. 
However, the COVID-19 pandemic changed all of this. The lockdowns and economic closures 
globally led to a fall in demand for oil and a slump in oil prices. Given Nigeria’s heavy reliance 
on oil revenue, this has had a significant impact on budgeted income. While income was 
squeezed, there was increasing pressure on the government to intervene to combat the spread 
of the virus as well as limit its economic and social impacts.  
The Response 
To cope with the significant economic burden caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the 
restrictions put in place to curb its spread, the Nigerian government introduced an amendment 
to the 2020 budget in May 2020. Appendix 1 presents key information from the original and 
 
1 Data from the World Poverty Clock https://www.worldpoverty.io/headline 
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amended budgets. The amended budget aimed at reprioritizing expenditure to ensure that funds 
are directed to areas in most need as well as providing a ‘modest’ stimulus to the economy 
(Budget Office of the Federation, 2020a). 
The amended 2020 budget includes a fiscal stimulus of ₦500bn ($1.3bn) designated as a 
COVID-19 Intervention Fund aimed at upgrading healthcare facilities, supporting sub-national 
government interventions, financing public works projects and funding social interventions. 
The COVID-19 Intervention Fund represents 4.7% of total expenditure in the amended budget. 
However, the stimulus effect of the COVID-19 Intervention fund may be blunted as the 
increased spending is more than offset by cuts to expenditure on capital projects, non-essential 
and deferrable projects as well as all non-essential expenditure of ₦594.5 billion. Given these 
offsetting budgetary cuts, the stimulus package can have only ‘modest’ impact and even this 
will depend on how well it is targeted. 
Alongside providing stimulus, the crisis has presented the government with opportunities to 
push through some structural reforms with attendant social implications which it might not 
have been able to do in normal circumstances. Particularly, in addition to the budgetary cuts 
already discussed, it removed ₦457.50bn allocated in the original pre-COVID budget for the 
subsidy of petroleum products. Introduced first over 40 years ago, the subsidy was aimed at 
protecting Nigeria’s poor against economic consequences of higher oil prices.  However, the 
subsidy regime has also been a drain on government revenues and linked to many cases of 
corruption and gross mismanagement (Akinola, 2018). Previous attempts to remove this 
subsidy have failed as a result of mass protests and strikes (Ejiogu et al., 2013). 
The government has also proposed to freeze non-essential recruitment into the public sector 
(with the exemption of health and security). Although the public service constitutes less than 
1% of the population, personnel cost in the budget account for about 27% of projected 
expenditure. Employment in the public services has previously been used as a means to reduce 
unemployment rates. Attempts by previous governments to halt recruitment and reduce the size 
of the public services have been met with resistance from trade unions. 
Allocations to sub-national governments have also been reduced in the budget. However, in 
order to maintain funding for essential sub-national government services the government is 
drawing US$150 million from the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority Stabilization Fund. 
The budget also gives a debt and interest moratorium to sub-national governments on Federal 
Government and Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) funded loans to sub-national governments in 
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order to free up debt service obligations and ameliorate the impact of reduced budgetary 
allocations. 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has also deployed monetary policy measures to 
complement the government’s fiscal measures. The CBN reduced the lending interest rate from 
9% to 5% for the one year starting from 1 March 2020. It established a ₦50 billion credit 
facility targeted at households and small and medium-sized enterprises that have been 
significantly affected by the pandemic. This credit facility is to be administered by the NIRSAL 
Microfinance Bank (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2020a). It also introduced a ₦100 billion credit 
intervention targeted at the indigenous pharmaceutical companies and other businesses in the 
health value chain with a view to enabling them expand capacity to meet potential increased 
demand for healthcare products and services (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2020b). The monetary 
policy response also included the devaluation of the Nigerian Naira and regulatory forbearance 
for the restructuring of credit facilities of financial institutions impacted by the pandemic 
(Cortes et al., 2020). 
The Nigerian Federal Government also deployed three major social interventions in response 
to the pandemic. First, it granted a 3-month moratorium on government intervention loans. 
There are about 2 million of these small scale government intervention loans which provide 
petty traders, farmers and small businesses with access to capital (Sanni, 2020). Second was 
the expansion of the existing national cash transfer scheme which targets the poorest and most 
vulnerable households in Nigeria. Prior to the pandemic, about 2.6 million households were 
registered on this and receive about ₦5,000 ($13) monthly as social protection (cash transfer). 
However, with the growing incidence of the virus and the social distancing measures put in 
place, the government has added an additional one million households to the cash transfer 
scheme and beneficiaries will now receive a ₦20,000 ($52) payout. This represents an advance 
payment rather than an increase in the monthly stipend (Opejobi, 2020). Third was the 
provision of food assistance (palliatives) to vulnerable households across the country to 
ameliorate the effects of the lockdown which had led people to face increased hunger in many 
regions of the country. While these social interventions have had some effects, they have been 
hindered by corruption and opaque accountability (Dixit et al., 2020). 
 
Funding the response 
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The economic, health and social interventions made by the Nigerian government have come at 
a time when the pandemic is also having significant effects on the country’s revenue streams. 
The government’s Budget Office estimates that net oil and gas revenue will decline by 80% 
from ₦5.47 trillion to ₦1.12 trillion as a result of reduced production and falling oil prices; 
customs revenue will decline from ₦1.50 trillion to ₦1.156 trillion as a result of border closures 
and reduced production; VAT receipts will decline by ₦60.42 billion and there will be 
significant declines in personal and corporate income tax receipts (Akabueze, 2020).  
Consequently, the Nigerian government has sought to raise funding for its interventions and 
indeed to finance its budget in a number of ways. First, it has increased its borrowing both 
locally and internationally. It obtained $3.4 billion of emergency support from the IMF 
(International Monetary Fund, 2020) to tackle the economic impact of the pandemic and has 
borrowed $4.34 billion from the domestic stock market (Dixit et al., 2020). In addition, it plans 
to borrow an additional $2.5 billion from the World Bank and $1 billion from the African 
Development Bank bringing total pandemic related borrowing from multilateral lenders to $6.9 
billion (Dixit et al., 2020; Osae-Brown and Soto, 2020). 
Second, in collaboration with the United Nations in Nigeria (UNAIDS and UNDP) it launched 
a COVID-19 Basket Fund. The Basket Fund is to serve as the single COVID-19 financing and 
investment platform for international donors to channel their financial support to Nigeria in 
order to ensure that their support is used efficiently, effectively and impactfully (UNAIDS, 
2020). While donors have contributed to the Basket Fund, they have done so cautiously and 
with a keen awareness of the issues of corruption and accountability inherent in the Nigerian 
government. For instance the European Union (EU) has contributed EUR 50 million to the 
fund but has insisted that allocation of the funds must be done in consultation with the EU 
(European External Action Service, 2020). 
Third, the government, through the CBN, called on the private sector and local philanthropists 
to fund the government’s COVID-19 interventions and indeed to engage in interventions of 
their own. As a result, the private sector in collaboration with the CBN established The 
Coalition Against COVID-19 (CACOVID) in March, 2020 (GBCHealth, 2020). Funds from 
this initiative are held by the CBN in a Private-Sector Led COVID-19 Relief Fund (Central 
Bank of Nigeria, 2020c). While CACOVID has raised over ₦30.1 billion ($72 million) as at 
the end of June 2020 (Coalition Against COVID-19, 2020), they have not come close to the 
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₦120 billion ($310 million) target set. This highlights the limitations of local (private sector-
led) funding for government interventions. 
 
Implications 
Fiscal Space 
The different government interventions to alleviate the coronavirus may have long-term 
implications for the fiscal sustainability and viability of the Nigerian state. First, the new budget 
deficit represents 3.55% of the GDP, which contravenes the Nigerian Fiscal Responsibility Act 
(FRA) (2007). The FRA, enacted to ensure prudent fiscal management and long-term macro-
economic stability, stipulates that the budget deficit should not exceed 3% of the GDP, except 
in the cases of threats to national sovereignty and security. The COVID-19 crisis could 
legitimately be deemed a threat to national security and as such, the State needs extra fiscal 
measures. In addition, the significant reduction in government revenue has led to a deterioration 
of the deficit-to-revenue ratio from the pre-pandemic level of 26% (based on the original 2020 
budget) to 89% based on the revised budget. The implication of this is that Nigeria’s 
government is not only borrowing money to solve a crisis, but its capacity to repay is also 
rapidly dwindling and it might never be able to repay if its revenue trend were to remain the 
same. 
Another consequence of the COVID-19 and fiscal crisis is the ballooning of Nigeria’s debt 
profile and the deterioration of its credit rating. Prior to the pandemic, Nigeria’s total public 
debt stood at $80 billion  i.e. 20% of GDP (Debt Management Office, 2020) and it’s income 
from oil was falling as a result of the drop in global oil prices. The fiscal space in Nigeria was 
lean. Borrowing to fund the COVID-19 interventions has put increased pressure on government 
finances and further squeezed the fiscal space in Nigeria. Indeed, without taking into account 
the additional COVID-19 related borrowing, the government projected a spend of about 48% 
of its budgeted revenue on debt service. With COVID-19 related borrowing, the debt-to-
revenue ratio is also likely to increase even more. This raises further concerns about the 
viability of the new loans and the solvency and financial sustainability of the country. Indeed, 
these concerns are reflected in Moody's Investors Service recent downgrade of the country’s 
credit rating from stable to negative.  
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Structural Reforms 
Historically, Nigerian borrowing from multi-lateral institutions such as the IMF and the World 
Bank has been tied to implementation of structural reforms including reduction in subsidies, 
curtailment of public expenditure, wage freezes, trade liberalization, currency devaluations etc 
(Agajelu et al., 2016; Davies, 1990). While these reforms are aimed at achieving macro-
economic stability, they have in fact led to lowering of standards of living and increased 
poverty in Nigeria (Igwe et al., 2016). Research shows that 70% of Nigerians oppose reduction 
or removal of subsidies (McCulloch et al., 2020) and indeed previous attempts to remove 
subsidies have been resisted by Nigerians through mass protests and strikes (Ejiogu et al., 
2013). While the new borrowing to fund the COVID-19 response did not come with any 
conditionalities, the economic crisis resulting from the pandemic created the space to enact 
structural reforms such as the removal of subsidies on petroleum products without the attendant 
protests. While, in the short-term, the impact of this will not be felt as oil prices are at rock 
bottom and in effect there are no subsidies being made, in the long-term when oil prices rise, 
people will have to pay more for petroleum products. In a country where most businesses and 
families depend on petrol to fuel private generating sets as electric power supply is erratic and, 
in some places, non-existent, this will have significant effects. For businesses, costs of 
production and service provision will rise leading to increases in prices of goods and services 
and further squeezing family incomes. This will affect the poor and vulnerable 
disproportionately. 
 
Business and Employment 
While the CBN introduced credit facilities targeted at the healthcare sector, households and 
small businesses, no interventions have been directed at businesses more generally as the 
government’s Emergency Economic Stimulus bill has been held up in the legislative process. 
Even if passed, the bill will only provide rebates of 50% of personal income tax deducted from 
staff to non-oil sector companies which do not make their staff redundant. This constitutes a 
significant gap in the interventions which may have long term effects as there are likely to be 
business failures, redundancies and increased unemployment in Nigeria. This is in the context 
of already very high levels of poverty and unemployment in the country. Indeed, in the latest 
years for which figures are available, between 2014-2018, 19 million Nigerians entered the 
labor force but only 15 million secured jobs, youth unemployment is acute with 66.6% of young 
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people unemployed or inactive and the adult unemployment rate stands at 33.3% (Cortes et al., 
2020). The rise in youth unemployment has been linked with a rising spate of criminal activity 
and anti-social behavior (Budget Office of the Federation, 2020b).  
 
Poverty and Social Inequality 
In addition to being the ‘poverty capital’ of the world, Nigeria is one of 10 countries which 
constitute the worst food crisis in the world (Food Security Information Network, 2020). 
Lockdowns and border closures have exacerbated issues of acute food insecurity, poverty and 
unemployment in Nigeria (Olurounbi, 2020). It is not surprising then that a number of 
interventions were specifically targeted at the poor and vulnerable.  
Most of these interventions were designed as short-term measures aimed at alleviating the 
impact of the COVID-19 on the lives of the poor. These interventions such as food assistance 
(palliatives), loans to households and the moratorium on government intervention loans 
provide temporary relief to the poor without any real long-term social impact. While, the 
expansion of the conditional cash transfer scheme to take in an additional 1 million 
beneficiaries has the potential to improve longer term educational and health outcomes for 
these families as conditions of the cash transfer usually relate to child attendance at schools, 
immunization and health checks, its impact is unlikely to be significant as the cash transfers of 
₦5000 ($13) per month is far below the international poverty line ($1.9 per day). 
As COVID-19 lockdowns loosen and the secondary effects of the pandemic and structural 
reforms enacted in response to the pandemic such as removal of subsidies on petroleum 
products bed in, we expect that poverty and food insecurity will become more acute and might 
lead to instances of civil unrest. In the extreme, these might lead to political instability creating 
a vicious cycle of poverty and political instability. 
 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Philanthropy 
The government’s approach to co-opting private sector and other non-governmental actors in 
their response to the pandemic has galvanized these sectors and unleashed a wave of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) and philanthropy on an unprecedented scale. These non-
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governmental actors have played an important role in mitigating the fiscal weakness of the 
government and strengthening the efforts of the government in fighting the virus. Corporate 
bodies have either donated financially to support the government’s effort or donated health 
facilities to serve as treatment or isolation centers. Religious bodies have also played an 
increased role in the state’s response. For instance, the Catholic Church in Nigeria donated all 
of their 425 hospitals to the government as isolation centers (Ajayi, 2020), other religious 
bodies have also donated a range of health facilities from ventilators to PPEs and financial 
support to the government as well as providing palliatives to indigent members of society. 
While the immediate support and philanthropy might end with the pandemic, the effects on 
expectations of CSR and the role of the corporation in society are likely to persist for the longer 
term. 
 
Health funding and Infrastructure 
Nigeria’s health sector suffers from decades of poor funding and mismanagement. Indeed, the 
World Bank notes that the Nigerian government spend on health is less than that of nearly 
every country in the world. The budgetary allocation to health in 2018 by the Nigerian Federal 
Government was only 4.5%, compared to 7.1% for education and 7.8% for power, works and 
housing. It is not surprising then that health outcomes in the country are among the poorest in 
the world (Cortes et al., 2020). The pandemic has focused attention on the gaps in the Nigerian 
healthcare system and interventions have been directed at building health infrastructure and 
strengthening capacity within the healthcare system. While these interventions will strengthen 
the healthcare system, the momentum needs to be sustained to have a long-term impact on the 
healthcare system and health outcomes. Indeed, a window of opportunity has now been created 
for the Nigerian government to improve funding of healthcare and create a better equipped, 
effective and more sustainable healthcare system. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This article engages with the budgetary response of the Nigerian government to the COVID-
19 pandemic. We describe the fiscal, monetary and social interventions which were introduced 
by the Nigerian government as well as the different ways in which the Nigerian government 
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sought to raise funds for these interventions. We then analyze the social and economic impacts 
of these interventions. Our discussion highlights how increased borrowing has significantly 
impacted on Nigeria’s fiscal space. It also highlights that while some interventions provide 
short-term economic relief to the poor and small businesses, other interventions and gaps in 
the policy response have potential for significant negative impact on businesses, households 
and unemployment. In addition, we highlight the potential for long-term benefits to the health 
sector and for private sector engagement in CSR and philanthropy. Taken together, while the 
budgetary responses to the pandemic have provided some economic and social relief, they have 
their inherent weaknesses which have renewed concerns about the financial and fiscal 
sustainability of the country. 
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Appendix 1: Budget Extracts 
 
2020 Budget* Revised 2020 Budget* Percentage 
Change**  
₦ ₦ % 
Total Revenue 8,419,164,479,598 5,559,123,316,422 -33.97 
Total Expenditure (10,594,362,364,830) (10,509,654,033,054) -0.80 
Deficit (2,175,197,885,232) (4,950,530,716,632) 127.59 
New borrowing to 
finance deficit 
1,594,986,007,544 4,173,560,052,788 161.67 
  
   
  
   
GDP 142,960,529,369,007 139,517,515,936,044 -2.41 
Debt Servicing 2,452,598,930,000 2,678,810,000,000 9.22 
Total Debt 28,628,493,630,000 32,802,053,682,788 14.58 
  
   
Deficit to GDP ratio 
(%)** 
1.52 3.55 133 
Debt service to 
revenue ratio (%) 
29 48 66 
Deficit to revenue 
ratio (%) 
26 89 242 
Total debt to GDP 
ratio (%) 
20 24 20 
 
*Figures from the Budget Office of the Federation (Budget Office of the Federation, 2020a). 
** Author derived figures 
 
 
 
